We present a model of electorally-motivated, small campaign contributions, an approach not present in the literature, and show it can explain observations that are hard to reconcile with a simple consumption motive. The analysis uncovers interesting e¤ects across small donors and has novel implications for the e¤ect of income inequality on total contributions and election outcomes. We also study the impact of di¤erent forms of campaign …nance laws, on contribution behavior, probabilities of electoral outcomes, and welfare. We show that these results are consistent with more behaviorally motivated donors when contributions are driven by parties'solicitation of funds. We also show how the model and its results may have important implications for empirical work on campaign contributions.
Introduction
The role of campaign contributions in elections is a central issue in democracies. Both the popular and academic discussion have largely concentrated on large donors, but in fact campaigns are …nanced by a mix of contributions from large (and very large) donors, the government (in many countries), and small donors. In the United States, the Federal Election Commission reports that the 2012 presidential campaign cost about $1. we also show the share of contributions by size.) 2 Small donors are important in other countries as well. In Canada, small donors represent about a third of total funds raised for recent campaigns). The …gure is similar in the United Kingdom, where a signi…cant share of party funding comes from membership dues and small donations (for instance, the Labour party reported £ 19.2 million in donations and £ 9.5 million in membership dues in 2015). 3 In Germany, small donors represent over about 53% of campaign resources in the 2012 cycle, with about half of that amount re ‡ect-ing party membership dues). 4 Small contributions account for such a signi…cant fraction of total funding because the number of small donors is enormous.
In short, small contributions are extremely important in overall campaign …nancing.
However, much of the theoretical literature has focussed on large donors and a policy 1 http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do;jsessionid=5E34A548A5EEB1D08BBECEA07049DF53.worker1 and http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do 2 PACs and super-PACs do provide large contributions, but one should note that they are also heavily …nanced by small contributions. 3 http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/Api/Accounts/Documents/17488 4 Most of the rest is public funding; medium and large contributions made up only about 9% of total resources. in ‡uence motive for contributing ("quid pro quo"). 5 To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal modeling of small campaign contributions, that is, a model which puts the choices of small donors on whether and how much to contribute into an explicit gametheoretic framework. In large part this appears to re ‡ect the view that small campaign contributions are a pure consumption good for those who contribute, analogous to charitable contributions. The basic reasoning is that because such contributions are so small relative to total campaign funding, donors cannot be motivated either by an attempt to buy in ‡uence nor by any e¤ect their contributions may have on election outcomes. A consumption motive wins almost by default because of the atomistic nature of individual small donations. 6 The aim of this paper is to study small campaign contributions in a more formal gametheoretic model where small donors are motivated by the desire to a¤ect election outcomes. 5 The leading theoretical model is that of Helpman (1994, 1996) . The empirical literature …nds mixed support (Stratmann, 1992 . Hence, it is not clear to what extent large contributions "buy" policy favors or even access to elected politicians. Given our focus on small contributors in this paper, we take no stand on that empirical debate. 6 Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) have stressed this view, arguing that the "tiny size of the average contribution made by private citizens suggests that little private bene…t could be bought with such donations"(p117) They support their argument with the …nding "income is by far the strongest predictor of giving to political campaigns and organizations, and it is also the main predictor of contributing to nonreligious charities" like other normal consumption goods. This is in addition to or in combination with any consumption motive, which we will argue may actually stimulate electorally motivated contributions in equilibrium. We discuss in detail in section 2 theoretical and empirical arguments supporting an (broadly de…ned) electoral motive for small donors. We develop a simple model of individual contributor behavior and show how electoral motives can coexist with consumption motives for contributions, as well as how our approach is also consistent with behavioral approaches to small donor behavior.
Because of the strategic interactions that must characterize any model giving a role to electorally-motivated contributions, individual and total contributions may be quite di¤erent than those implied by a model of individual choice that ignores such interactions (e.g. a basic model of contributions driven solely by the consumption motive). As a consequence, the equilibrium e¤ects of campaign …nance laws may be quite di¤erent than conventional wisdom or existing literature suggests.
As will become clear, by "small" donor we mean two things. First, the donor takes the policy of candidates as given, which is simply to say that there is no motive of trading contributions for policy favor. Moreover, and central to our notion of a small donor, each donor takes the behavior of other donors as given. That is, though a donor crucially assumes that his donation has a non-zero (albeit small) positive e¤ect on the probability that his preferred candidate is elected, this is through the numerical e¤ect of his contribution on the aggregate amount the candidate collects rather than through any direct e¤ect on other donors. 7 There are strategic complementarities between donors, but they are "price takers." Hence, 'small' can refer to donors who make substantial contributions in dollar terms, but who expect neither to receive policy favors in return nor to in ‡uence other donors directly.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss in detail conceptual arguments about how and why the perceived in ‡uence of money on the election outcome shapes individual contributions. In section 3 we develop a simple model of individual contributor behavior in which optimizing donors decide how much to contribute to their preferred candidate, taking into account how the probability of a candidate winning the elections depends on total contributions to each of two candidates. We then derive in section 4 the equilibrium level of individual and total contributions, as well as the equilibrium probabilities of election. This allows us to perform comparative statics on, for example, the size of contributions and the preference intensity of donor groups, as well as the income distribution between and within groups. The analysis shows total contributions may rise or fall with increases in income inequality depending on its source, so that increases in income inequality may bene…t the leading or the lagging party. In section 5
we show how the same basic results would obtain with "naïve" donors being solicited by electorally-motivated parties, that is, thinking of donors as being more "behavioral"than in our main model of fully rational donors and of parties as the optimizing actor.
We then analyze in section 6 the e¤ects of various campaign …nance laws. We …nd that a cap on individual contributions generally favors the party with the largest number of donors and works against the party with the richest contributors, but local e¤ects are not necessarily monotonic. Caps on total campaign spending necessarily hurt the party with the largest budget, but may also incentivize donors from the lagging party to contribute more, so that the party initially ahead loses more than the direct e¤ect of the legal constraint would suggest. Finally, we study the e¤ect of public subsidies to the campaign budget and …nd that equal block subsidies to both parties help the party that is behind, while matching subsidies for or taxes on contributions leave election probabilities unchanged only if they a¤ect all donations proportionately. In section 6.3 we consider the welfare implications of how money a¤ects election outcomes and of policies to limit the e¤ect of contributions, focussing on issues of how campaign …nance laws may limit the in ‡uence of income and may help control the "arms race" of ever-higher aggregate contributions. Section 7 presents conclusions, and further material and proofs are in Appendices.
Our …ndings should also be relevant for empirical research on campaign contributions, as the di¤erent motives for contributions produce qualitatively di¤erent donor behavior responses. To give two examples, closeness of an election should have no …rst-order e¤ect on donors if contributions are simply a consumption good, but will a¤ect contributions that are electorally motivated. Second, an implication of our model is that donors will be induced to contribute more to a candidate who is lagging behind (an "underdog" e¤ect) whereas when contributions are made in exchange for policy favors, the incentive is to give to the candidate who is ahead. Our approach also has interesting empirical implications for the e¤ect of income inequality on contributions, where e¤ects will depend on whether it is within the group of a candidate's supporters or between supporters of di¤erent candidates.
Estimates of the overall income elasticity of contributions may also be biased depending on whether a candidate is ahead or behind.
On the Electoral Motive
Logical as it may sound that small donors are too small to be motivated by anything other than a pure consumption motive, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons why electoral motives for small donors, either directly instrumental or behavioral, should not be rejected out of hand.
From a theoretical perspective, "very small" is not zero. That is, a non-zero e¤ect of an individual's contribution on the election outcome means that an optimizing donor should take this e¤ect, however small, into account. This simple observation proves particularly important when we embrace the presence of a consumption motive for campaign contributions. The presence of the consumption motive guarantees that the opportunity cost of the …rst dollar of contribution driven by the electoral motive is essential nil. Then, it must be that even an in…nitesimal e¤ect on the election outcome will drive additional contributions. Moreover, in that case, it would be erroneous to equate small e¤ect with small electorally motivated contributions. Indeed, the magnitude of electorally motivated contributions prove to depend on the speci…c form of the utility function, and it is easy to …nd utility functions (e.g. CARA utility functions) that lead to electorally motivated contribution that are relatively large.
To make this clearer, consider the following simple example. An individual divides his income y between consumption C and campaign contributions q: She also values government expenditure G: Let us …rst consider the case where the individual believes her contribution q has no e¤ect either on policy directly (the in ‡uence motive) or on the election outcome (the electoral motive). She then treat G as a parameter in her decisionmaking. With only the simple consumption motive -she gets direct utility from contributions q (represented by a utility function U (C; q; G)), an individual contributes until @U=@C = @U=@q: Call this level q 0 : The marginal utility cost of increasing q above q 0 by a dollar is therefore 0. Now add an electoral e¤ect. Suppose there are two candidates, A and B, who promise expenditures G A and G B respectively. The individual prefers candidate A to candidate B; that is, she prefers expenditure level G A to G B : Denote the probability that A wins by A ; so that the electoral motive is represented by @ A =@q > 0. Since the marginal cost of increasing q above q 0 is zero, the individual will be motivated to increase her electoral contribution for any non-zero @ A =@q. The gist of the argument is straightforward: electorally-motivated contributions can become economically signi…cant because their marginal cost is extremely small.
The previous argument supports the idea that, while combined with a consumption motive, a purely instrumental electoral motive may have bite. But, our objective here is not to defend such a purely instrumental electoral motive. Our approach is consistent with a more behavioral perspective. For instance, individual contributors could overestimate the in ‡uence of their contribution on the outcome of the election. Another possibility would be a more elaborate consumption motive, in which marginal utility of contributions would directly depend on the marginal e¤ect contributions have on the election outcome (maybe because money is more important in close races, which the media cover more intensely). In section 5, we formally show that a behaviorally-based consumption model -where it is parties rather than individuals who are taking into account the e¤ect of small contributions on electoral outcomes -yields conceptually the same results as those produced by the baseline model. In that alternative model, donors are "naïve"in that they respond positively to their party's fund-raising e¤orts according to a simple behavioral rule.
Fund-raising is costly and parties strategically decide how to allocate their fund-raising e¤orts, where the key assumption is that parties believe that money helps them win the election. Under simple and intuitive assumptions about the behavioral rule of donors, equilibrium contributions are the same as if we assumed purely instrumental donors. 8 Second, empirical regularities also support the importance of a (broadly de…ned) electoral motive for small donors. First of all, in surveys (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Barber 2016), donors overwhelmingly list "to a¤ect an election outcome" as an important motive for giving. Of course, they may be hiding their true motives 9 , or they 8 Those readers who prefer such an approach may want to skip to section 5 to see the basic set-up and then move to the material directly following (7) and (8) where we begin discussion of the implications of these conditions for electoral equilibrium. 9 As Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower (2017) put it, information from surveys "lack external validity may be basing their answers on grossly in ‡ated estimates of their probability of a¤ecting ) is that contributions are made to legislators who "will represent their professional interests, rather than due to expectations of legislative access or an unsophisticated response to networking."This too is consistent with an electoral motive rather than simply a consumption motive for giving.
should not in itself be taken as empirical evidence for the consumption motive against other motivations. We show below that it is fully consistent with an electoral motive for small donations.
Model
We model a contribution game in which a pre-determined set of donors simultaneously decide how much to contribute to their preferred candidate's campaign, to increase his chances of election (we identify donors with the pronoun "she"and candidates with "he").
This captures a situation in which donors are "small" in the sense that they take both platforms and the actions of the other donors as given. 11 Throughout, we focus on the case of perfectly informed donors.
Candidates.
We consider an election with two candidates, A and B, who need funding to run their electoral campaign. The total amount of contributions received by a candidate P is Q P : We summarize through a contest success function (Tullock 1980 Given total contributions Q = fQ A ; Q B g 2 R 2 + ; P 's probability of winning the election is given by:
with > 0, such that the winning probability is strictly increasing in Q P . Note that P is everywhere concave in Q P for 1: Values of > 1 capture the presence of setup costs:
P is then convex for Q P < Q P q 1 +1 Q P : In words, P 's campaign must reach Q P for additional contributions to have maximal e¤ect. Figure 1 illustrates the shape of A for = 1 (in blue), = 2 (in red), and = 3 (in black) when Q B = 1. 
Donors.
A large number of donors must, simultaneously and non-cooperatively, decide how much to contribute to their candidate. 12 Each donor i has a two-dimensional type p i ; y i 2 fa; bg R + , where p i 2 fa; bg identi…es who is her favorite candidate/party.
Naturally, a-donors support candidate A and a b-donors candidate B: small and capital letters are used to avoid confusion between donors and candidates. y i represents i's income, which will in ‡uence her willingness to contribute.
Income distribution.
The n p donors of type p are distributed in income classes
and
The fraction of type-p donors with income y i is denoted f p y i = F p y i F p y i 1 0; and y p is average income across all p-donors.
Objective function.
In line with the motivation discussed in the Introduction, we focus on the electoral motive for contributing to the candidates'electoral campaign. That is, each donor contributes some amount q i P 2 [0; q] to in ‡uence the outcome of the election -q is the legal contribution limit. In light of the discussion in Section 2, the marginal cost of contributing must be zero at q i P = 0 and strictly increasing above that. Assuming iso-elastic cost functions, this amounts to setting > 1 in the objective functions (2) and
where v p is the intensity of the donors'preference for their candidate and Q i is the vector of contributions by all donors other than i. 13 The parameter will help parametrize the elasticity of contributions with respect to income: for = 0, the cost of contributing is independent of income. For > 0 instead, this marginal cost is strictly decreasing in y i .
In that case, equilibrium contributions will be increasing in income.
Given individual contributions, the total level of contributions received by party P is:
where " A and " B represent the prior contributions, personal war chest, and/or the voters'
initial support of the two candidates. 14;15 In the core of the paper, we set them to " A = " B ! 0. In Appendix 2, we show how they in ‡uence voluntary contributions when we relax that assumption: a larger " A reduces P n a i=1 q i A but increases Q A , for instance.
Donors'Incentives
Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, we highlight two important forces that shape a donor's contribution. Let Q i A denote total contributions to candidate A by donors other than i, and rewrite (1) as:
1 3 It is straightforward that types p i = a want to contribute 0 to B, and conversely for types b. 1 4 With a focus on why money polarizes politics, Feddersen and Gul (2015) let the probability of winning be a combination of voter support V and monetary contributions M :
This formulation amounts to setting < 1 and considering asymmetric marginal e¤ects of contributions (see below), which could be integrated into our model. However, since platforms are …xed in our model, we can focus on the simpler case of our model. 1 5 Technically, winning probabilities are indeterminate for QA = QB = "A = "B = 0. Setting "A; "B positive but small solves that problem.
We can then immediately derive the marginal e¤ ect of a type a's contribution on winning probabilities:
and, similarly:
Decomposing these e¤ects identi…es two central components of the donors'incentives:
B , a donor's contribution 0 P increases in election closeness A B (maximized in A = 0:5) and decreases in Q i P (a free-riding e¤ ect).
Taking account of contribution costs, …rst order conditions produce the following bestresponses (for non-binding contribution limits):
For types b :
Taking the above equations together highlights a two-way interaction between individual contributions q i P and the marginal e¤ect of a contribution 0 P . A higher 0 P increases an individual's contribution in (7) and (8) , which increases aggregate contributions Q P . This in turn feeds back into 0 A and 0 B via (5) and (6): both election closeness and free-riding are a¤ected. Importantly, exactly the same strategic interactions would obtain in a model of behaviorally motivated donors who respond to candidate solicitations, as set out in Section 5.
Equations (7) and (8) also make clear the role of income in determining the level of individual contributions: the elasticity of a contribution with respect to income turns out to be = ( 1). This shows that, unless one believes that a donor's willingness to contribute is independent of income ( = 0), a well-speci…ed electoral motive will predict that contributions are strictly increasing in income -hence, the fact that contributions rise with income is not in itself evidence of a consumption motive. Moreover, it also implies that one cannot estimate the income elasticity of contributions without taking account of the indirect e¤ects of income variations and inequality on total contributions. Indeed, these will also in ‡uence 0 P , and therefore equilibrium contributions.
Equilibrium Analysis
We focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria of this contribution game: each donor's contribution must be a best response to the vector of contributions by all other donors. In this section, we study the properties of unconstrained equilibria: we assume that the cap q on individual contributions is not binding, and that candidates do not face constraints on spending. The e¤ects of campaign …nance laws a¤ecting these constraints are the focus of Section 6.
The …rst step is aggregate the best responses (7) and (8) to obtain a total contribution for each candidate that is consistent with individual incentives:
with:
Note crucially that (9) and (10) are composed of two factors of a di¤erent nature. The …rst, W P , only contains various parameters that de…ne the primitives of the game. From now on, we thus treat W A and W B as parameters of the model, and call them the group's willingness to contribute. The second factor is 0 P , the marginal e¤ect of contributions, which as discussed already, is endogenous to the donors'actions.
Without loss of generality, we label A the candidate who is Ahead and B the candidate who is Behind, in the sense that W A W B . Let:
summarize the asymmetry in willingness to contribute between the two parties. Note that ! is strictly increasing in W B =W A for W B =W A 1 (and decreasing for W B =W A > 1).
The unconstrained Nash equilibrium of the contribution game is found for the case in which there are no limits on individual contributions, i.e. when q = 1. Our …rst proposition identi…es su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, characterizes the equilibrium, and shows that it is unique (most proofs are relegated to Appendix 3):
Proposition 1 Whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique and characterized by the aggregate contributions:
which result in the following winning probabilities:
Two su¢ cient conditions for Pure Strategy Equilibrium existence are:
(1) and, if < , (2) W A =W B not too large:
As we already got a hint of (see Observation 1), equilibrium contributions are a¤ected by free-riding. The fact that A is ahead implies that free-riding is stronger among a-donors:
Observation 2 In any equilibrium, the ratio of contributions for A and B displays an underdog e¤ect:
That is, equilibrium relative contributions for A are always smaller than A's intrinsic
Such an underdog e¤ect has already been identi…ed for voters'participation, …rst by Simon (1954) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) , and more recently by Herrera et al. (2014) in a model with a a contest success function. 16 We are not aware of a similar …nding regarding political contributions; to the contrary, the policy in ‡uence motive typically used to analyze contributions would predict that contributors are larger to the advantaged candidate, that is, the candidate more likely to win. This would lead to a Bandwagon e¤ ect.
Stratmann (1992) shows that PAC contributions do display a bandwagon e¤ect around a threshold strictly below 50%, followed by an underdog e¤ect above that threshold. Bonica (2016, Figure 2 ) however …nds that small donors behave substantially di¤erently: their contributions disproportionately ‡ow to underdogs (about 55% of their funds, instead of 85% for Corporate PACs). Such a fact is di¢ cult to reconcile either with either the in ‡uence or the consumption motives. Very large and small donors thus appear to have di¤erent intrinsic motivations.
As is the case for turnout in Herrera et al. (2014) , it is crucial to note that free-riding issues cannot reverse A's initial advantage. 17 As a result, A's probability of winning does increase in her intrinsic advantage W A =W B , but this increase is attenuated by free-riding.
In the absence of free-riding, her probability of winning would be
In Appendix 2, we detail additional comparative statics on the importance of money in elections (as parameterized by ) and on the e¤ect of closeness on total equilibrium contributions (Q A + Q B ). Our main focus in this section, however, is on the e¤ects of income and income inequality on equilibrium contributions.
Equilibrium E¤ects of Income Inequality
The e¤ects of rising income inequality on elections has become a central issue both in public debate and in academic research (see e.g. Feddersen and Gul, 2015) . The typical perception is that it increases polarization and unduly favors the party with the richest supporters. The following lemma shows how willingness to contribute a¤ects contributions.
We then use it to study the e¤ects of income inequality: (1) of the a-donors' income distribution increases Q A and decreases Q B .
(2) of the b-donors' income distribution increases both Q A and Q B .
The intuition is that, if the elasticity of contributions to income, 1 , is strictly larger than 1, contributions become a convex function of income. Increasing within-group inequality then increases the aggregate willingness to contribute W P . However, a given increase in inequality does not have the same aggregate e¤ects on the advantaged or in the trailing party (see (1) versus (2) in Proposition 3).
It is also interesting to understand how these aggregate e¤ects play out in terms of individual contributions. To simplify the argument, consider an increase in the income of one of the income classes in a group -say of the richest A-donors. These donors thus increase their contributions. This increases free riding by other income classes in group a: However, Q A must be increasing in W A ; meaning that the drop in contributions by the other donors is only partial There is a further cross-party e¤ect: b-donors now face a lower incentive to contribute, which further reinforces the gap between A and B. A similar change within group b has the same within group e¤ects, but the opposite crossgroup e¤ect: closeness increases contributions in the a group, which dampens the boost received by B. The equilibrium e¤ects of income inequality thus always work in favor of the advantaged party.
To summarize these propositions, empirical work on the e¤ects of income inequality on contributions should distinguish between within-group versus between group inequality, what is the source of inequality, and also take account of whether a candidate is leading or trailing.
A Model of Naïve Donors and Party Fund-Raising
One may argue that modeling donors as fully rational and strategic in their instrumental behavior lacks realism. That is, in their electorally-driven giving, small donors may display more "behavioral"motivations. For example: (1) donors may mechanically react to media attention and/or party fund-raising e¤orts, and the media or parties focus more on tighter races 18 -we investigate this possibility below; (2) free-riding e¤ects could be rationalized by individual donors enjoying "feeling important"-they would therefore contribute less if other donors contribute more (note that "herding" e¤ects in consumption would produce the opposite result); (3) candidates may intensify their fund-raising e¤ort on small donors when large donors have contributed less: this would also be consistent with a free-riding result. 19 The purpose of this section is to show that our key results are fully consistent with such behavioral motivations. Comparative statics go in the same direction or can even be identical. We show that a reasonable functional representation of behavioral responses lead to the same …rst-order conditions, and hence identical results. Hence, whether individual behavior is driven by a purely instrumental electoral motive as above, or by another type of 1 8 In other words, one could consider the case in which 0 P (Q) enters directly the utility function of the consumer of political races. We owe this observation to the seminar participants at the Harris School. 1 9 We thank Debraj Ray for suggesting some of these alternative scenarios consistent with our results.
behavioral-instrumental motive, the strategic interactions identi…ed in the previous section are key to understanding how aggregate contributions are determined in equilibrium.
To formalize this point, we assume in this section that small donors are "behavioral"
in the sense that they mechanically respond to party nudges. Parties, on their side, need to exert a costly e¤ort in order to induce their supporters actually to contribute to their campaign. This change in perspective transforms our model into a "demand-side" model in which parties are the strategic actors, rather than a "supply-side"model in which donors were the strategic actors.
Such an alternative model could be as follows. As in our base model, there are n p donors of type p, distributed in income classes y 1 < ::: < y G according to some (discrete) distribution function F p y i ; that satis…es the same assumptions as in section 3. We assume that donor i reacts mechanically to her party's (costly) fund-raising e¤ort, denoted e i P . Her contribution q i P is increasing and concave in both e i P and y i . We represent this functionally by: 
where parameterizes the donors'elasticity of contributions exactly like in the instrumental model. The Cobb-Douglas speci…cation is chosen both for simplicity and to relate with the main model.
Parties choose e i P to maximize their probability of winning net of the cost of fundraising (where, for simplicity, we let the cost of soliciting a donor be e i P ):
It follows that:
Substituting these equilibrium levels of party e¤ort into the donors'contribution functions (14) and (15) yield:
which is identical (but for the factor 
If instead, they maximize in-group aggregate social value (consistent with FeddersenSandroni) of electing their candidate, they would maximize:
This would require higher individual contributions when there are more donors in a group, to take account of the positive externalities of one contribution on the other donors of the same group. In Section 6.3, we study the social optimum and …nd that the latter ruleutilitarian solution would actually be detrimental to aggregate welfare. The optimum typically requires some form of cap on contributions. But, to show this, we must …rst study the potential e¤ects of various campaign …nance regulations.
Campaign Finance Laws
We study four types of campaign …nance laws that are widespread around the world: (1)
Caps on individual contributions (used, for example, in the U.S., Canada, Chile, France, Israel, and Japan, among others); (2) Caps on total donations/spending (e.g. in many countries in Europe, as well as Chile, Israel, New Zealand, and South Korea) ; (3) Public subsidies to parties (e.g. in many countries in Europe, as well as Israel, Japan, and Mexico) either as block subsidies or as proportional subsidies to individual contributions (including tax deductibility of contributions).
Rationale for campaign …nance laws
Campaign …nance laws are, very generally speaking, meant to limit the "in ‡uence of money in politics". One rationale is that large contributions buy policy in ‡uence outside of any direct e¤ect on voting, that is, trading contributions for policy favors in a "quid pro quo", as discussed in footnote 5. Such a rationale, as important as it might be in practice, plays no role here as we abstract from the in ‡uence motive. 20 A second rationale is that campaign spending has exploded because it is like an "arms
race"-what is crucial is the level of total contributions relative to those of one's opponent.
Hence, the level of money ratchets up without giving either candidate a relative advantage but simply draining resources.
A third argument is that a donor's in ‡uence on elections is determined by the size of her contribution, so that large contributors have undue electoral in ‡uence. In that context, contribution caps are meant to ensure that the "voices of small donors" are also heard (this is sometimes referred to as the "equalization" argument). This is central to our paper, where richer donors contribute more simply because they are richer and, all else equal, have a greater e¤ect on election outcomes.
Campaign …nance laws: the positive e¤ects of caps and subsidies
What we show here is that, due to the strategic complementarities highlighted in the previous sections, even the positive e¤ect of a regulation such as a contribution cap is not straightforward. Among other things, small donors will be a¤ected even if they are not directly capped, an e¤ect almost entirely ignored in the literature. The complementarities central to small donor behavior further suggest that the e¤ects of caps on election outcomes may also be far from simple. In the next subsection, we discuss the positive e¤ects of di¤erent campaign …nance laws, and their welfare e¤ects in section 6.3.
Caps on individual contributions
The complexity of possible e¤ects is illustrated in the following two propositions: we …nd that the e¤ects of contribution caps can go in exactly opposite directions, depending on whether the advantage of A results from a wider support (Proposition 4) or from a richer set of donors (Proposition 5). Moreover, the e¤ects need not be monotonic:
Proposition 4 Consider the case of identical income distributions and preference intensity (v p ) for a-and b-donors, but n a > n b . In that case:
(1) A will be lowest when the cap is not binding;
(2) A will be highest when the cap constrains all donors; (3) Depending on the shape of the income distribution, the e¤ ects of varying the cap can be non-monotonic.
The main driver of the di¤erence between (1) and (2) is the underdog e¤ect (see Observation 2). With n a > n b ; free riding implies that an a-donor with income y i contributes less than a b-donor with the same income. When the distributions of income among aand b-donors are su¢ ciently similar, any binding cap must therefore constrain b-donors more than a-donors. Candidate A is thus better o¤ with no cap than with a cap, and worse o¤ when the cap is binding for all donors.
Importantly however, this does not imply that the e¤ects of a cap are monotonic, as illustrated in Figure 3 . 21 The reason is that capping high-income donors stimulates 2 1 The simulation behind Figure 3 builds on a two-group income distribution with y l = 3 and y h = 10; while we set = = 2, and v p = = 1. The number of low-and high-income donors are: n contributions by low-income donors and impacts closeness -remember that closer elections stimulate contributions by all income classes in both groups, see Section 1 and Appendix 2. Thus, while the direct e¤ect of the cap favors A (b-donors being more constrained), indirect e¤ects tend to work in the opposite direction, and may dominate.
In our numerical example, the fact that contributions by low-income donors represent about half of the total received by each candidate is su¢ cient to produce such reversals: the left pane depicts the equilibrium individual contributions by each donor type (except for high-income b-donors who are capped throughout), given the cap on the horizontal axis. The right pane depicts the probability that A wins as a result of these contributions.
As one can tell, indirect equilibrium e¤ects dominate for intermediate caps.
Now, contrast these results with the case in which the advantage of A is due to higher donor income, rather than a numerically larger donor base:
Proposition 5 Consider the case in which A and B have equal popular support (n a = n b ) and preference intensity, but a-donors bene…t from higher income, by a factor > 1 (f a y i = f b y i , i = 1; :::; G). In that case, the e¤ ects of a cap are the opposite of the ones in Proposition 4:
(1) A will be highest when the cap is not binding;
(2) A will be lowest when the cap constrains all donors; (3) Depending on the income distribution, the e¤ ects can be non-monotonic.
The intuition and the mechanism of the proof are similar to those of the previous proposition, with the di¤erence that, if a-donors are richer but no more numerous than b-donors, they must be the …rst constrained. Hence, there are more a than b constrained donors, and any unconstrained a-donor contributes more than the equivalent b-donor. The initial logic is thus the same as above, with the important di¤erence that closeness and free-riding e¤ects now work in the opposite direction, as illustrated in Figure 4 . 22 
Caps on total spending
Caps on total campaign spending, either by parties or by individual candidates are observed in some countries (Ohman, 2012 ). In our model, campaign spending by a candidate is equal to total contributions by her supporters, so that we could think of limits on the total size of campaign spending as a cap on total contributions. When the cap on total contributions is binding for both candidates, their total contributions are necessarily identical. We thus focus on the interesting case in which the cap only constrains A:
Proposition 6 Capping total contributions for A increases contributions for B. Therefore, A's probability of winning decreases by more than the direct e¤ ect of the cap would imply. Total contributions Q A + Q B may increase or decrease as a result.
A cap a¤ecting only A increases elections closeness, which stimulates contributions for B, further favoring the latter candidate. This crowding-in e¤ect on Q B can be so strong as to increase total contributions: ( Q + Q B ) can actually increase when the cap on total campaign spending ( Q) is tightened. This typically happens when A's lead of is initially 2 2 This numerical example also builds on two income classes in each donor group: y large (see Appendix 3). 23 
Campaign subsidies
Finally, consider the e¤ects of campaign subsidies. We study two of them: (i) a block subsidy, where the government gives a lump-sum of s dollars to both candidates' campaigns; and (ii) a matching subsidy, where for each donation q i P ; the government gives an additional m dollars to party P 's campaign. In the presence of subsidies, the total level of contributions received by the two parties become:
Block subsidies
Consider …rst a block subsidy s alone, so that m = 0 in (16):
Proposition 7 Block subsidies increase the relative voluntary contributions for A; but decrease the probability that A wins:
A block subsidy has a direct negative e¤ect on the probability that the most popular party, A, wins. This should not be surprising, since an equal subsidy to both candidates "levels the playing …eld". However, this direct e¤ect is attenuated by the di¤erent reactions n a = 100 > n b = 10 (like in the other examples, = = 2 and = 1). As one can see on Figure 5 , Q A increases in s when s is low, and decreases in s when s is large. 24 One direct implication of this proposition is that, neither crowding-in nor crowding-out e¤ects of public subsidies may compensate the direct e¤ect of the subsidy on the probability 2 3 Note that this e¤ect is di¤erent from the one in Che and Gale (1998) , who consider an all pay auction. In that auction, expected total contributions are everywhere (weakly) increasing in the cap, except at a point of discontinuity. When the cap is above that level, the high-valuation bidder can make such aggressive bids that the low-valuation bidder shaves his bids signi…cantly. That reduces total contributions. 2 4 We did not …nd any example in which a block subsidy has a crowding-in e¤ect on individual contributions by b-donors. that A wins. Moreover, for both parties, the sum of total individual contributions plus the block subsidy always increases with the size of the subsidy.
Matching subsidies to and taxes on contributions
A matching subsidy m (which may be negative, that is, a tax on contributions) with no block subsidy (s = 0 in (16)) has no e¤ect at all if it applies to all contributions. Proposition 8 A campaign contribution matching subsidy of m that applies to all contributions has no e¤ ect on the behavior of donors, nor on the outcome of the election. On the other hand, a matching subsidy which applies only to contributions below a certain level can a¤ ect election probabilities.
The …rst part of the proposition may not be very surprising, given the form of our contest success function. Since the matching subsidy increases each (and hence total) contributions by the same fraction m for both candidates, it has no e¤ect on the relative position of the two candidates, and hence no e¤ect on election probabilities. Matching subsidies may a¤ect outcomes for other speci…cations of the contest success function, but the mechanism behind Proposition 8 makes clear why a general matching subsidy will not have a major e¤ect as it has little or no e¤ect on relative candidate positions.
Analogously, there is no reason to anticipate that it should either systematically increase or systematically decrease individual contributions.
A matching subsidy the only applies to contributions below a certain level, 25 on the other hand, will have an e¤ect. If the aggregate amount of matched contributions (contribution plus matching funds) rises, contributions of those above the matching threhold will decrease. The overall impact on the election could however go either way.
Turning to taxes on contributions, making them dependent on the size of the contribution acts like a negative size-dependent match. Since contributions depend positively on income, this would be like a di¤erential tax on contributions, that is a function of income.
Such a tax has the possibility of reducing or even eliminating the e¤ect of income on contributions, an issue to which we return in considering the welfare implications of campaign …nance laws. Consider the following tax on contributions as a function of income:
Proposition 9 A tax on contributions equal to h y i 1 i q i P removes the e¤ ect of income inequalities from equilibrium contributions.
Such a tax means contributions in each income class are independent of the income of active donors.
Campaign …nance laws: welfare considerations
We now consider the welfare implications of campaign …nance laws, concentrating on contribution caps. As discussed in section 6.1 above, a key rationale for such restrictions is that unlimited contributions give rich donors disproportionate in ‡uence on election outcomes. Another argument was to limit the overall explosion of the size of campaign spending.
The debate for example in the United States, as re ‡ected in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, has been largely framed in terms of issues of 'freedom of speech'. In the famous Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) the court had upheld previous limit on corporate spending, writing "Corporate wealth can unfairly in ‡uence elections." Analogously, Justice Stevens, in the minority dissent in Citizens United, reiterated the "unfair in ‡uence" argument, writing that "unregulated expenditures will give corporations 'unfair in ‡uence' in the electoral process and distort public debate in ways that undermine rather than advance the interests of listeners."
These arguments can directly be formalized in the framework of our model. Starting from the sum of the donors'individual utilities, we could consider the following objective function for the social planner (SP):
In light of the above arguments, however, such a welfare function is inappropriate. Simply because the contribution costs are lower for richer donors would produce the result that richer donors deserve disproportionate in ‡uence on the election outcome. Correcting this bias requires setting = 0 in the objective function:
The free-speech argument amounts to saying that the group, a or b, with the largest n p v p "deserves" winning with the highest possible probability, whether because they are more numerous (larger n p ) or because they have more intense preferences (a larger v p ;
presumably an in ‡uence meant to be protected under the First Amendment). However, this requires allowing them to contribute to the campaign of their candidate, which has a cost
= in the social welfare function. Limiting the size of the campaign spending may thus con ‡ict with the former objective.
Assume that n a and n b represent the total number of voters on each side (all voters are potential contributors, but some have zero income available for contributions and hence contribute nothing). Suppose the planner had perfect information about the n p v p :
If (without loss of generality) n a v a > n b v b , his optimum would be to reduce contributions to B to zero, and allow contributions to A to just compensate for the risks introduced by " B , as long as the bene…t exceeds the cost to group A of these contributions.
Three objections can be raised to this result. First, the outcome the social planner can achieve will depend on the tools at hand, with the issue that the objective function is then itself dependent on the instruments. Second, there is no reason to expect the social planner has su¢ cient information about the number of voters on each side, nor the intensity of their preferences -otherwise elections would not even be needed. Instead, it is the very contributions by donors that are expected to signal these values, with the issue that the social planner wants to learn about v p while getting rid of the in ‡uence of the donors'income.
The …rst two objections suggest looking at a constrained information optimum where the tools the social planner has are the campaign …nance regulations considered in the previous section. The third objection and the trade-o¤ between revealing information and minimizing the costs of the campaign are actually not simple to address.
In considering the welfare e¤ects of campaign …nance laws, we therefore consider how they may bring the ratio of total contributions closer to n a v a n b v b (or some monotone function thereof), instead of
like in the unconstrained equilibrium of Proposition 1.
The former is the ratio of total contributions that would obtain if there were no income di¤erences between groups, nor free-riding e¤ects. We call constrained optimum the joint objective of bringing the contributions ratio closer to n a v a n b v b and reducing the costs of the campaign.
Contribution caps
The simplest case to consider is where the groups do not di¤er in their valuations, that is, v a = v b , re ‡ecting a situation where individuals in the two groups are believed to care equally on average about election outcomes. Hence, di¤erences in groups re ‡ect size, and perhaps income. We …nd that, in this case, individual contribution caps are an appropriate instrument:
, and " A = " B ! 0, a tight cap on individual contributions can bring welfare arbitrarily close to the constrained optimum.
A su¢ ciently tight cap means that all non-zero donors in both groups contribute the same amount, eliminating the e¤ect of income. If the ratio of donors to non-donors (individuals with y i = 0) is the same across groups, i.e. F a (0) = F b (0), a su¢ ciently tight cap brings us back to the case of "one man, one vote," which is implicitly the objective when v a = v b . This policy even produces a double dividend: on top of bringing the contribution ratio closer to the …rst best, it also decreases waste. In contrast, a cap on aggregate contributions would decrease costs, but hurt A and therefore move the outcome away from the constrained optimum. The same holds for block subsidies in our model.
A more di¢ cult case is when v a and v b di¤er, so that contributions may re ‡ect either di¤erences in income or in preference intensities. If one believes that contributions di¤er because of di¤erences in the v P rather than in income between groups, then binding contribution caps would destroy the information that contribution di¤erences convey, which is welfare-reducing. (Note further that capping contributions by the richest induces the less rich to contribute more, to compensate.) If, conversely, contribution di¤erences re ‡ect income disparities rather than disparities in v p ; then caps can move outcomes closer to the optimum by eliminating the "noise" in contribution di¤erences.
Combining caps with taxes on contributions
Although a tax on contributions has not been considered in practice as part of campaign …nance legislation, we show it can help address this conundrum (see the next section for a discussion of matching subsidies.) Under the tax to contributions set out in Proposition 9, equilibrium behavior actually leads to contributions that are independent of income:
However, there is still a trade-o¤ between the cost of campaign contributions and the revelation of information about prefernce intensity. The following proposition show that a cap may be used to address that trade-o¤:
Proposition 11 Fix n a = n b and " A = " B , and let contributions be taxed like in Proposition 9. Then, equilibrium contributions are the same as if = 1 and social welfare displays two local optima: one is with q = 0 and minimal campaign costs. The other one is with q = max i q i P and, e¤ ectively, free speech. But any cap in between these two levels must be welfare inferior to one of these two extreme solutions.
The intuition for this result is that, thanks to the tax, a cap constrains contributions of all donors in a same group in the same way. With v a > v b , the cap …rst constrains all a donors. If it is tightened further, there is a level, call it , for which all donors are capped.
It follows immediately that, for any cap q < , winning probabilities are constant. Any cap tightening is then a Pareto improvement.
For q > instead, a cap tightening reduces the probability that A wins. The question is whether this is more than compensated by the decrease in the costs of the campaign.
To address this question, we use the envelope theorem: at the equilibrium, the indirect e¤ects of a marginal cap tightening are second order. We thus only need to take account of direct e¤ects, which are n a v a n b v b A . Since A is negative, the total e¤ect can only be negative.
Matching subsidies
As is made clear in section 6.2.3 above, a general matcing subsidy has no e¤ect omn election outcomes, while a matching subsidy for donations below a certain level will have an e¤ect.
It has been argued that matching of small donor funds can provide a counterweight to "big money", even more so with the the growing importance internet and social media fundraising. 26 The disadvantage of the subsidy in comparison with the tax is that it can only worsen the cost of contributions problem.
Caps on total contributions
Caps on total spending would address the "arms race" nature of contributions, which is well captured by the contest success function, where a proportional increase in Q A and Q B would leave election probabilities unchanged. However, contributions are not exogenous Finally, note the implication that both candidates and donors may bene…t from contribution limits, even in the absence of any policy distortion, simply because the contributions "arms race" is de-escalated. The overall amount of resources wasted on the campaign is reduced, and the cap increases the probability that the party supported by the largest number of donors wins. The possible optimality of caps does not depend on controlling the ability of groups to buy policy in ‡uence. It can arise in a model where contributions are instrumental only to the extent they a¤ect election probabilities.
Conclusions
Conventional wisdom is that small donations to political campaigns are a consumption good to the donors. In large part this is a conclusion by default. The basic reasoning is that because each small donation is so small relative to total campaign donations, small
donors cannot be motivated either by an attempt to buy in ‡uence nor by any e¤ect they may have on election outcomes. A consumption motive is what remains.
As intuitive as this reasoning may sound, in our opinion it misses several basic points.
First, "very small" is not zero. Though a zero probability of, for example, a¤ecting the election outcome would imply a zero electorally-motivated contribution, an extremely small but non-zero probability would imply a positive, though small, contribution. Second, strategic complementarity will magnify the e¤ect of small donations even if donors act atomistically (that is, non-cooperatively). Hence, a small increase in the marginal effect of contributions may produce a substantial aggregate impact over and above the e¤ect implied by large number of donors. , but also because of the strategic complementaries across donors. Therefore, individual and total contributions may be quite di¤erent than those implied by an individual decision-making model without complementarities, such as a simple consumption motive model. The e¤ect of a change in campaign …nance laws, for example, may thus be quite di¤erent than conventional wisdom or existing literature suggests. Both of these suggest the importance of building and studying a model of optimizing small donors who may be driven by instrumental rather than simple consumption motives.
A third observation points in this direction as well. There is signi…cant empirical evidence suggesting that electoral motivations do in ‡uence contributions. These include the importance of ideological proximity as a strong determinant of contributor behavior, indicating that donors care about election outcomes; the signi…cant positive e¤ect of perceived closeness of an election on donations; and, simply, the surveys of donors who overwhelmingly list "to a¤ect an election outcome" as an important motive for giving.
The model we present demonstrates that the desire to a¤ect the election outcome can be an important motive for small donors. We show that such a model can reproduce some basic stylized facts. At the same time, we …nd that a formal decision-theoretic model of electorally-motivated donors yields predictions di¤erent than simple intuition may suggest ex ante. This is highly relevant to interpreting empirical results on the e¤ect of changes in the characteristics of donors (such as a change in the income distribution)
or of campaign …nance laws. Our results from a well-speci…ed theoretical model point to pitfalls in empirical estimation of determinants of campaign contributions.
As a …nal note, our focus on the electoral motive does not rule out alternative decisiontheoretic approaches, such as a combination of richer behavioral and electoral motivations for giving. As such the paper should be read not only as an exploration of an electoral motive for small donations, but more generally as an exploration of decision-theoretic approach to small donors in contrast to a simple consumption motive. One can see that, in 2015, the bulk of campaign …nance was coming from contributions between 1350 and 2700. Contributions below $201 represented respectively 2% and 5% of the total in Q2 and Q3. In 2016, instead, the sum of all contributions above 1350 fell to less than 50% of the total, and represented less than 25% of the ‡ow of contributions by the end of the campaign. Instead, the total value of contributions smaller than $201 end up representing 43% of the total in Q4 2016.
But the evolution of contributions over the campaign cycle clearly shows that, even if the contribution game may be one of face-to-face meetings and relatively large individual contributions early in the campaign, there is a shift to a more anonymized game among an extremely large number of very small individual contributions (the 75th percentile of contributions drops from $2700 in Q2 2015 to $75 by Q1 2016) . It is hard to believe that, in this later phase, an individual donor's main motivation could be to in ‡uence the candidate's platform.
Appendix 2. Additional comparative statics HETEROGENEOUS POPULAR SUPPORT
This appendix uses the results of Section 3.1. In most of the paper, we assume that the election probability of each party only depends on its campaign spending. This proxies a symmetric situation in which the two parties' popular support is symmetric, meaning that their probability of winning would be 1/2 if campaign spending were to drop to zero. Here, we show that the incentives and some properties we identi…ed extend to the case in which popular support is asymmetric.
We capture the in ‡uence of each party's popular support on its probability of winning as a shifter " P (> 0) in the contest success function:
In that case, the MEC becomes:
where
It is thus essentially the same as in the base model, except for the fact that party-P donors'incentive to contribution is proportionately reduced by the popularity shock experienced by the party. The underdog e¤ect therefore applies in a complementary way:
where the …rst factor is the same underdog e¤ect as in the base model, and the second shows that a popularity boost for party A further reinforces the initial underdog e¤ect. Conversely, a popularity boost for party B reduces it -and may reverse it if " B increases so much that it compensates B's …nancial disadvantage (normalizing " A to zero, the condition becomes: Q A ? Q B 1 + " B =Q B ).
THE INFLUENCE OF MONEY IN ELECTIONS
Proposition 1 also informs us of how the sensitivity of election outcomes with respect to campaign funding (as captured by the parameter ) in ‡uences the total size of the campaign and the election probabilities:
Observation 3 A higher may translate into costlier or cheaper campaigns (Q A + Q B can be increasing or decreasing in ). In all cases, a higher reinforces the advantage of A ( A converges monotonically to 1 as ! 1).
One e¤ect of election probabilities being more sensitive to contributions (a higher ) is that it traps donors into a larger "arms race". Both donor groups are compelled to contribute more, because the marginal e¤ect of contributions increases. That e¤ect always favors A because collecting funds is comparatively less costly for a. This, in turn, produces a second e¤ect that works against the former: the increasing gap between A and B reduces the marginal e¤ect of contributions: A B in 0 P falls. This reduces the incentive to contribute. Which e¤ect eventually dominates determines whether total contributions increase or decrease in . 27 
THE INFLUENCE OF CLOSENESS ON CAMPAIGN SIZE
Observation 4 Ceteris paribus, total campaign spending Q A + Q B strictly decreases in W A =W B , and hence strictly increases in the closeness of the election, A B .
Proof. Fix W A + W B = W . For that case, we prove that:
Indeed:
Hence:
where we used the fact that dW B =dW A = 1. From the de…nition of !; the …rst term is zero for W A = W B and strictly negative for W A > W B . The same holds for the second term.
Appendix 3. Proofs of the Propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1. We are focusing on pure strategies. Even when the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, there must be a mixed strategy equilibrium, since payo¤ functions are continuous and bounded above. We are not interested in such MSE, because they are not realistic in our context.
Plugging (5) and (6) into (9) and (10) ; then taking the ratio between Q A and Q B shows that
in a pure strategy equilibrium: We can therefore substitute for Q B in (9), and solve for the equilibrium value of Q A as a function of the exogenous parameters of the game, W A , W B ; and :
Q B is derived following the same steps, and from the fact that
2 . The latter implies that ! is identical for A and for B.
Second, equilibrium existence of a pure strategy equilibrium depends on the second order conditions being satis…ed for this vector of total contributions. After some simpli…cations, the SOC for type-a donors can be expressed as:
which is always satis…ed since A B : A similar condition must hold for b donors:
2 8 Second order condition amounts to looking at di¤erent points of the contest function for a and for b donors. Since a donors contemplate a higher winning probability than b, their SOC is automatically satis…ed: they are in the concave part of the CSF. Instead, b donors may be in a spot in which the CSF is convex. That is, a slight decrease in their contribution base would also decrease their individucal incentives to contribute. For su¢ ciently high values of , this would reinforce the drop in individual incentives so markedly that total contributions may be driven to 0. In that case, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The proposition shows that this can never happen if is no larger than 2, or -for largerif the contribution bases are not too asymmetric.
Noting that A B = !, we can rewrite this condition as follows: Proof of Lemma 1. From Proposition 1 and the de…nition of !, we have:
Taking derivatives and simplifying yields:
B (2 + ) and
The latter always positive, and the former is necessarily positive for 2: For > 2, we need to invoke the second order condition for equilibrium existence: we saw that for b h su¢ ciently large (one can actually check that the same holds for n b l and n b h large enough), it can be approximated by: A B < 1= (see (18) ; p38). Now, the sign of @Q A @W A must be the same as that of:
is the numerator of P . Substituting the SOC in the second term shows that the latter cannot be smaller than 1, whereas the former is equal to 2. Hence,
is always be positive when an equilibrium exists. Next,
A (2 + ) and
where the former is always positive and the latter always negative.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the e¤ects of income on W P in (11), follow the logic of the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Remember that Proof of Proposition 4. Remember that y i 2 y; y with y > 0 and y positive and …nite.
In that case, there exist two cuto¤s q 0 and q 1 for the cap on individual contributions q, such that:
8 q > q 1 , no donor is constrained and 8 q < q 0 all donors are constrained. By Proposition 1, for q > q 1 , the ratio of total contributions must be:
r n a w a n b w b = r n a n b ;
and winning probabilities are the ones in Proposition 1. For q < q 0 , all donors contribute q.
Therefore, Q A = n a q and Q B = n b q. The contribution ratio is thus n a n b , and it is immediate to derive that A's winning probability is then First, we show that q a y i;a > q b y i;b for all unconstrained donors of some income group i, and hence that more a-than b-donors will be constrained. We prove this by contradiction: the only Figure ? ? displays total contributions: one can readily see that relaxing a tight cap produces the expected e¤ect of increasing total contributions (Q A + Q B ). However, the e¤ect is reversed for Q > 13:75: it is then a tightening of the cap that increases total contributions.
Proof of Proposition 7. The Marginal E¤ ect of i's Contribution to P can now be written as (for " ! 0):
Thus, for any s, the two FOCs give:
This requires that Q A > Q B : Note also that Proof of Proposition 8. For " ! 0, we can rewrite these total contributions as functions of the total contributions without the matching subsidies:
Plugging that into party P 's probability of winning the election, we get
As a consequence, incentives, and therefore the equilibrium, are the same for any m 7 0:
Proof of Proposition 9. With this tax, the cost of contributing q 
